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Abstract. The Tangle-based structure becomes one of the most promis-
ing solutions when designing DAG-based blockchain systems. The ap-
proach improves the scalability by directly confirming multiple transac-
tions in parallel instead of single blocks in linear. However, the perfor-
mance gain may bring potential security risks. In this paper, we construct
three types of attacks with comprehensive evaluations, namely parasite
attack (PS), double spending attack (DS), and hybrid attack (HB). To
achieve that, we deconstruct the Tangle-based projects (e.g. IOTA) and
abstract the main components to rebuild a simple but flexible network
for the simulation. Then, we informally define the three smallest actions
to build up the attack strategies layer by layer. Based on that, we provide
analyses to evaluate the different attacks in multiple dimensions. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to provide a comprehensive
security analysis of Tangle-based blockchains.
Keywords: Tangle · DAG · Blockchain · Attack · IOTA
1 Introduction
Blockchain has emerged as the most prevailing technology in recent decades. In
the early stage, blockchain was simply applied to the direct payment system,
represented by Bitcoin [19]. Later, blockchain was employed as the distributed
state machine to provide an executable environment for complicated tasks, rep-
resented by Ethereum [28] and EoS [14]. However, more and more specific sit-
uations, such as IoT, micropayments, and edge computing, require high prop-
erties on scalability, performance, and cost. Therefore, Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG) is designed to improve the bottleneck of classic blockchain systems from
the underlying structure. Different from the linear-chain in classic blockchains,
DAG-based blockchain systems remove the limitation of blocks, expanding the
network through a directed acyclic graph. Newly generated transactions with-
out packing into blocks establish the network by directly confirming their parent
? This paper (conference version) has been published at ACISP’20 [27].
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transactions. Through several iterative rounds, the main graph is formed with a
low probability to be reversed.
Tangle structure is proposed by IOTA [21], one of the leading DAG-based sys-
tems. It aims to overcome the bottlenecks of current blockchain systems which
include poor throughput on concurrency, low efficiency on performance, and
high-cost on transaction fees. Tangle can be regarded as an expanding net-
work formed by the continuously generated transactions. Transactions act as
the smallest elements in the system to execute atomic operations, such as to-
ken transferring, witness validation, path extending, etc. The transaction-based
Tangle possesses the properties of 1) High throughput : Transactions can be at-
tached to the network from different directions and verified by previous transac-
tions in parallel without serious congestion. 2) High performance: Newly arrived
transactions are confirmed by the previous two transactions via a tiny Proof of
Work (PoW) mechanism, where the computer consumption is negligible when
compared to the traditional PoW. 3) Low cost : There is no transaction fees
in Tangle-based systems, which perfectly fits for the high frequent situations
including IoT, micropayment, and edge computing.
However, Tangle-based blockchain systems confront the potential threats
caused by the forks of subgraphs which spread in different directions. Following
the specified tip selection mechanism [21], the system forms a multi-directional
expansive network [22] to improve the scalability. More specifically, Tangle4
achieves the delayed confirmation based on previously verified transactions in
each direction, instead of an instant confirmation such as BFT-style consensus
[6]. The gap between delayed confirmation and instant confirmation leaves the
blank of uncertainty and reversibility for attackers [13], same as other probabilis-
tic consensus like PoW [19][28]. Existing chains are also threatened by miners
who own insurmountable computing power to send massive transactions. Newly
issued transactions are unpredictably attached to different subgraphs without
control. Forks will frequently happen and leave the system under the risk of
parasite chain attack and double-spending attack [9]. As a result, no leading
subgraph can be formed to maintain the relatively stable states of the network.
In order to mitigate the issues, an additional centralized Coordinator is em-
bedded in Tangle (e.g. IOTA project5) to resist the potential attacks. Transac-
tions snapshot by the Coordinator is immediately considered to be confirmed
with 100% confidence. In addition, milestones are periodically broadcast by the
Coordinator to reach the consensus across multiple subgraphs for stability and
record the history by removing useless branches. Nodes accordingly rebuild the
Merkle tree which contains the Coordinator’s address to verify the milestone.
This makes Tangle inherently a centralized system. IOTA official claims to cancel
this centralized coordinator in the future. However, problems still exist without
the Coordinator. The isolation and fork of each subgraph cannot be thoroughly
4 In the rest of the paper, we use Tangle to represent the Tangle-based blockchain
systems.
5 https://docs.iota.org/docs/the-tangle/0.1/concepts/the-coordinator?q=
coodinator-&highlights=coordinator%27
solved. The network will inevitably spread into dispersed cliques under its in-
herent mechanism. We aim to provide comprehensive analyses of such risks by
establishing three types of attack strategies. Our contributions are summarized
as follows.
– Simulation of Tangle: We deconstruct the Tangle-based system (IOTA)
into main components including transaction generation, bundle unit, and
selection algorithms. Based on that, we rebuild a simple but flexible simu-
lation network. The simulation inherits the features of Tangle and provides
an experimental environment for evaluations.
– Construction of attack strategy: We define three actions as the ba-
sic benchmarks to construct our attack strategies layer by layer. The bot-
tom layer (Layer0 ) describes the role of each basic action. The media layer
(Layer1 ) presents the possible behaviors made up of actions. And the top
layer (Layer2 ) provides the attack strategies made up of combined behaviors.
– Evaluations of attacks: We evaluate the security through multiple met-
rics under different types of attack strategies. The discussions of potential
influences include 1) Different proportions of behaviors at the same attack
strategy; 2) Different attack strategies at the same parameter configuration;
3) Different parameter configurations at the same strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The related works are provided
in Section 2. The deconstruction of Tangle-based architecture and the rebuild-
ing of the simulation are presented in Section 3. The constructions of our attack
strategies are provided in Section 4. Based on that, the implementation is shown
in Section 5, followed by evaluations in Section 6. Section 7 presents the discus-
sions of simulated attacks. Finally, Section 8 concludes our contributions and
the future work.
2 Related Work
DAG [2], as a primitive in mathematics and computer science, is a finite directed
graph with no directed cycles. Deeply rooted in the graph theory, DAG-based
structure can be applied to various areas including data processing networks,
genealogy and version history, citation graphs, data compression, etc. Currently,
researchers and developers are trying to bring the DAG into the blockchain, to
address the bottlenecks of scalability and performance. GHOST [25][26][17] as
the backbone selection protocol provides an educational prototype for current
DAG-based blockchain systems. Unlike the classic Nakamoto consensus which
chooses the longest chain, GHOST protocol selects the chain that holds the
maximum sub-trees. It greatly improves throughput while holding the same
block size. Inspired by GHOST, several blockchains replace the sub-tree structure
into graph structure and redesign the whole consensus mechanism and network
topology [7][23][20]. Rather than focusing on the consensus at the block level,
DAG prioritizes consensus at the transaction level in a separate mechanism. The
transaction-based structure is inherently suitable for the micro-services, where
Tangle-based blockchains exactly inherit the advantages. Although DAG is a
competitive player, technical problems still exist. IOTA provides many strategies
for the designation and protection, which are detailedly and explicitly described
in [22][15][21][16].
Several improvements by researchers are proposed to strengthen the poten-
tial weakness of Tangle. Cullen et al. [8] proposes a matrix model to analyzes the
efficacy of IOTAs core MCMC algorithm, and present the improvement to resist
parasite chain attacks. The matrix model clarifies the formulation for H, to pro-
vide the explicit definition in the MCMC algorithm. Ferraro et al. [10] proposes
a modified tip selection algorithm to make all honest transactions eventually
be confirmed. The hybrid selection algorithm achieves the balance between bi-
ased preference for honest tips and high probability for older transactions. Gewu
Bu et al. [5] modifies the tip selection mechanism, called G-IOTA, by choosing
three verifying transactions at one time instead of two. Through the proposed
algorithm, G-IOTA can tolerate several attacks.
Besides Tangle, there are also many other DAG-based systems. Byteball [7]
proposes the consensus based on a total order within DAG. The uni-direction
is achieved by selecting a main chain to gravitate towards units issued by com-
monly recognized reputable witnesses. Spectre [24] aims to establish the DAG
structure based on concurrent and parallel block creation. It utilizes a recursive
voting procedure where each block submits a vote for every pair of blocks. Ac-
cepted transactions are confirmed according to the votes. Hedera [3] develops
the Hashgraph consensus algorithm as the underlying model. Inspired by BFT
consensus, Hashgraph sets the 2/3 as the threshold, where a successful confir-
mation of newly generated transactions requires more than two-third witnesses
from their ancestors. Nano [1] designs a low-latency cryptocurrency built on
block-lattice data structure. Each account maintains an individual chain. Users
update their chains asynchronously and keep track of their account balances
rather than transaction amounts. All aforementioned DAG-based systems offer
high scalability and low/no transaction fees. Graphchain [4] proposes a DAG sys-
tem following a similar tip selection rule with IOTA where one tip approves two
ancestor transactions. The system additionally introduce a fee-based mechanism
to establish the confidence of tips.
3 Structure of Tangle Simulation
Tangle is a permissionless network, providing an environment for data shared by
all participants. In this section, we deconstruct the architecture of Tangle-based
blockchains into three main components, which separately answer the question
on how to generate a transaction, why need to bundle the transactions, and how
to select the parent transactions for verification. Based on that, we abstract the
key features of these fundamental components to rebuild a simple but flexible
Tangle network for the simulation.
Fig. 1: Tangle with Its Features.
Overview: Tangle bases on DAG where the vertex represents transaction and
the edge represents verification relationship. Instead of the separation between
making transactions by local users and achieving consensus by online miners,
Tangle integrates these processes into one step. Whenever the transaction is
generated and attached to Tangle, the consensus is simultaneously launched.
Newly generated transactions are continuously attached to the network along
with increased participants, which inevitably makes the subgraphs spread in
different directions. In order to prevent the network split into isolated sub cliques,
tip selection algorithm is essential to lead the main graph in one direction to
maintain the stability. Here, we provide a skeleton to show how Tangle forms
and works, with the following procedures.
Generate a Transaction: IOTA follows the model of UTXO, and transactions
establish its network. Successfully generating a transaction requires to fill the
fields of index, address, trunkTransaction and branchTransaction. The index is an
accumulator, linearly growing along with the increased transactions. The address
is used to identify transactions and generated by cryptographic sponge function.
Subseed is an 81-tryte derived from the initialized seed and corresponding in-
dexes under Keccak-384: hash(seed + index). Each address in IOTA could
only be spent once. If the address is used for the second time, it becomes poorly
secure with high risk, due to the exposure of private subseed. Once a user with-
draws the tokens from one address, it immediately creates a new address with
an increased index. To achieve a complete round of withdraw/deposit, multiple
pairs of private keys and addresses are necessary. As a consequence, it leads to
the concept of the bundle.
Insight: The transactions are the smallest components serving for further
construction in Tangle. Every operation of token transferring and transaction
verification is based on newly generated transactions. The trends of the net-
work are caused by the behaviors of transactions. Therefore, we focus on the
transactions and analyze potential behaviors that may frequently happen. The
transaction can be used as an approver for both honest behaviors and malicious
behaviors of the previous transactions. We define three basic actions to build up
the behaviors surrounding a transaction in Section 4.
Packaged Transactions as Bundle: Bundle, the basic unit structure in IOTA,
is a top-level construction that links related transactions into one clique. The
bundle itself cannot be broadcast, instead, a collection of individual transac-
tions are broadcast. All transactions can be regarded as part of the bundle,
and the metadata is recorded on every single transaction (in trytes format) in-
stead of the virtual bundle. In other words, a bundle can be reconstructed from
the transaction collection at any time through the fields of bundle hash, index,
trunkTransaction and branchTransaction. The trunkTransaction field is used to
link transactions in the same bundle where a transaction with a higher index can
trace back to lower index by targeting their unique trunkTransaction strings. The
branchTransaction field is used to connect bundles in Tangle. All transactions
in the same bundle are filled with the same branchTransaction string, except
for the initial transaction and tail transaction. These two special transactions
distinguish one bundle from another, bridging different units in the network.
Details are shown at Fig.2 in Appendix D.
Insight: The bundle is the basic unit serving for money transferring. There
are no real entities in the network, and all the steps are executed through trans-
actions. Collective transactions inherently share the same seeds from one node,
so that we regard the bundle as a separate vertex in the network. Packaging
collective transactions into one bundle guarantee the security level in an open
environment. In our simulation, we ignore the bundle structure and only abstract
the key features of the bundle, (such as PoW, parent selection, etc.). We apply
these features into transactions for simplicity in a closed testing environment, as
shown in Section 4.
Tip Selection Algorithm: Tip6 selection represents the selection strategies of
newly generated transactions. The strategy of Tangle follows the principle: one
tip selects and approves two ancestor transactions. This principle decides the
direction of the graph as shown in Fig.1.a. As above-mentioned, transactions in
Tangle are organized in bundles, where the tail transaction is selected by the
approver through the trunkTransaction field for final consistency. The trunk-
Transaction field connects different transactions in the same bundle, shown in
the green lines in Fig.2. Each transaction with a higher index can trace back to
a lower index. The branchTransaction field inside the bundle is slightly differ-
ent, all of the transactions are filled with the same string, except for the field in
initial and tail transactions. The initial and tail transactions are generated by
tip selection mechanism to connect different bundles, as the blue lines in Fig.2.
There are three kinds of Tip selection mechanisms provided in [21]: Uniform
Random, Unweighted Random Walk and Weighted Random Walk. Note that the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo Algorithm (MCMC) is based on a weighted random
walk. For the higher probability of being selected, several matrices are proposed
for better evaluation. height (h) represents the length of the longest path, equal
6 Tip means the newly generated transactions that have not been validated.
to the path from genesis to the current transaction. depth (d) means the longest
reverse-oriented path, equal to the path from current transaction to a certain tip.
Cumulative weight (W) is counted as the number of transaction v being verified
both directly and indirectly. W reflects the probability of a tip being selected
by the random walk algorithm. α is the configurable parameter to control the
effectiveness ofW in MCMC. When α converge towards 0, tip selection becomes
uniformly random, while towards 1, tip selection becomes deterministic.
Insight: Tip selection describes how a newly generated transaction selects its
ancestors. No matter which detailed mechanism the node chooses, the selection
processes are all based on the variants of the random algorithm. The algorithm
guarantees a tip can select in the large range without strict rules. We divide the
selection algorithm in a general way shown in Section 4.
Mapping to Simulation: Based on the deconstruction of Tangle, we conclude
three insights as to the guidelines for our attack simulations of Tangle. Then, we
capture the key features as in Fig.1.b on how to rebuild our simulation networks.
Here are the details.
– For the structure, the simulation is based on the UTXO model proposed by
Bitcoin [19]. The UTXO model is naturally fit for DAG-based blockchain
systems since there is no account in DAG. The UTXO model is responsible
for the correctness of the balance.
– For the basic unit, the simulation employs the transaction directly as the
smallest unit instead of the bundle. In a closed environment, the key-exposure
problem can be ignored. The transaction-based exchange provides us a flex-
ible reconstruction.
– For the topology, the simulation follows the original pattern of Tangle: ev-
ery tip verifies two other parent transactions by selection mechanism. The
selection mechanism is determined by factors as discussed in Section 5.2.
– For the tip selection mechanism, we capture three most influential factors
in Tangle including cumulative weight, level difference, and operation time.
Tips select their parent transactions according to the Equation 1.
– For the attack strategy construction, we build three typical attacks con-
fronted by Tangle, containing PS, DS, and HB. The constructions of attack
strategies are built on the smallest actions layer by layer.
4 Construction of Attack Strategies
In this section, we provide three main attack strategies: Parasite Attack (PS),
Double Spending Attack (DS), and Hybrid Attack (HB). Each strategy repre-
sents a family of concrete attacks that inherit the same foundations. To make it
clear, we start from the smallest units to progressively establish a practical at-
tack. We construct the strategies by three layers: layer0 for unit actions, layer1
for atomic behaviors and layer2 for combined attack strategies. Note that, the
actions and behaviors defined below are mainly focused on the malicious nodes
since honest nodes will conduct honest transactions and behaviors. Only mali-
cious/dishonest nodes have multiple combinations. Here, we provide the details.
4.1 Layer0: Unit Actions
We define the smallest unit actions in the bottom layer, denoted as layer0, to
describe the activities and behaviors a node can select. It can be regarded as a
binary selection at each unit action, and the combination of unit actions make
up an atomic behavior in layer1. More specifically, we list three-unit actions as
the metrics, including:
– Action A: The unit action A represents whether a newly generated transac-
tion is 1) valid [A1] or 2) invalid [A2].
– Action B: The unit action B represents whether a newly generated transac-
tion is attach to the parent tips 1) by the random selection mechanism [B1]
or 2) by selecting the transactions which are issued by same nodes/entities
with itself [B2]. Here we call B2 as selfish selection.
– Action C: The unit action C represents whether a newly generated transac-
tion is selected from 1) the pool with valid transactions [C1] or 2) the pool
with invalid transactions [C2]. We denote the first one as the valid pool and
the second as the invalid pool.
We can see that each set of unit action are made up by two possible choices
to describe the instant state. We denote this process as a binary selection for
simplicity and clarity. We use 1 to represent the selections of elements in the
first line {A1, B1, C1}, while we use 0 to represent the selections of elements in
the second line including {A2, B2, C2}. We summarize each possible selection
in Table 1. It should be noted that selfish selection means a newly generated
transaction and the parent transaction is issued by the node with the same
identity (either honest or malicious).
Table 1: Unit Action
Action A Action B Action C
Valid Tx [A1] Random Selection [B1] Valid Pool [C1]
Invalid Tx [A2] Selfish Selection [B2] Invalid Pool [C2]
4.2 Layer1: Atomic Behaviors
Layer1 is a collective set of various behaviors made up by different combinations
of unit actions. The behavior assists to describe how to generate a transaction
at the initial stage. The behaviors are atomic for the construction of attack
strategies and are also closely related to the category of attack types. Here, we
summarize feasible atomic behaviors in Table 2. Note that, every single behavior
covers the unit actions A, B, and C. We employ the binary selection 0 and 1 to
distinguish the combinations of unit actions.
Table 2: Atomic Behaviors
Binary Selection Action Combination Feasibility Index
111 (A1, B1, C1) Y a
110 (A1, B1, C2) Y b
101 (A1, B2, C1) Y c
100 (A1, B2, C2) N -
011 (A2, B1, C1) Y d
010 (A2, B1, C2) Y e
001 (A2, B2, C1) Y f
000 (A2, B2, C2) N -
From Table 2, we can see that there are 8 possible atomic behaviors which
are used to show how a malicious node executes the transactions. Take 101 -
(A1, B2, C1) as an example, it means the behavior that A malicious node gener-
ates a valid transaction, being selfishly attached to the parent tips from the valid
pool. This behavior is feasible in the simulation without logic error, denoted as Y
in the Feasibility column. On the contrary, the behavior 100 is infeasible, since
no invalid transaction exists in the network if the malicious nodes only send
valid transactions. Similarly, the behavior 000 is infeasible since for a malicious
node. Selfishly attaching processes from the invalid pool is equal to the random
selection from the invalid pool, which means 000 is equal to 010. Therefore, only
6 of the behaviors are feasible, and we mark them with indexes from a to f .
4.3 Layer2: Combined Attack Strategies
Based on the behaviors in layer1, we construct attack strategies in layer2. We
identify three types of attacks, including Parasite Attack (PS), Double Spending
Attacks (DS) and Hybrid Attacks (HB). The parasite attack means an attacker
secretly creates a sub-Tangle with high weights and attach this sub-graph at
some time to the network. It may reverse the main Tangle when newly attached
transactions are widely distributed. Double spending attack means an attacker
creates the same transaction more than one time. This attack splits Tangle into
two branches so that s/he can spend one coin multiple times in different branches.
PS and DS are pure attacks without the overlap of behaviors, whereas HB
represents the attacks containing overlapping behaviors, such as f (Detailed
explanation in the later paragraph). Here, we provide the decision principle,
denoted as Φ, on how to categorize the attacking types. We conclude four stages
of the decision processes shown in Equation 1.
Confusion behavior− stage1
Send the invalid Tx− stage2
Verify the invalid Tx− stage3
Overlapping behavior− stage4
⇒ Φ (1)
For the stage1, the confusion behavior means the malicious node pretends to
act as an honest node, such as the behavior a: A malicious node sends a valid
transaction, being randomly attached to the parent tips from the valid pool. We
cannot obtain any useful knowledge to distinguish whether the transaction is
issued by an honest or malicious node. stage2 represents a malicious node sends
invalid transactions, where related behaviors in layer2 are (d, e, f). stage3 refers
to the parent tip selection, and related behaviors are (b, e). stage4 provides the
overlapping behaviors including (c, f). Therefore, the general decision principle
Φ is shown in Equation 2. The symbol “-” means do not exist.
(a,−) | (d, e, f,−) | (b, e,−) | (c, f,−) (2)
Alternatively, based on the Φ, we provide the concrete decision principle
for the PS, DS, and HB, which are separately denoted as Φ[PS], Φ[DS] and
Φ[HB] as in the Equation 3. The key principle of PS is to selfishly select parent
transactions, while the principle of DS is to send/verify invalid transactions. But
there are some overlapping behaviors and logic errors in the strategy. Therefore,
we provide each attacking type by specified decision principles. The detailed
principle is listed in the second column of Table 3.
{Φ | Φ[PS], Φ[DS], Φ[HB] } (3)
Based on the decision principles for each attacking type, we back to the
reason why the behavior f is an overlapping behavior. The behavior f means:
A malicious node sends an invalid transaction, being selfishly attached to the
parent tips from the valid pool. On the one hand, f selfishly selects its parent
tips, satisfying the condition of PS (Φ[PS]). On the other side, f sends an invalid
transaction to the network, satisfying the condition of DS (Φ[DS]). Therefore, f
is an overlapping behaviors applied in the hybrid attacks (Φ[HB]).
Table 3: The Performance of Increased User Size
Attack
Types
Decision
Principle
Feasible
Behavior
Attack
Strategies
(a,-) | (d,e,f,-) | (b,e,-) | (c,f,-)
PS (a, -) | - | - | (c) c,f c,ac (2)
DS (a,-) | (d,e) | (b,e) | - b,d,e,f e,ae,bd,de,abd,
ade,bde,abde (7)
HB (a,-) | (d,e,f) | (b,e) | (c,f) f
ce,bf,ef,cef,bcf,bef,bce,def,cde,
bdf,bcd,aef,acef,abf,abcf,ace,
abef,abce,adef,acde,abdf,abcd (22)
5 Implementations
5.1 Parameters and Notations
In this subsection, we provide the notations used in our implementations and
testings. There are two types of parameters in the system, the first are binary
parameters such as (A1, A2) as discussed in Section 4, used for the construction of
attacks. Since the transactions are atomic in the simulation, we ignore duplicated
introductions. The second are continuous parameters such as operating time,
number of total transactions, etc. They are used for adjusting the configurations
during the simulation. The related continuous parameters are denoted below.
The parameters include total transactions T , honest transaction H, invalid
Transaction F , intervals between two newly generated transaction D, time of
PoW I, height of block h, simulation operating time T , level difference L and
cumulative weightW. Besides, derived parameters also provided: strategy space
S, transaction generation speed T/(D + I), the ratio of invalid transaction and
the total transaction ratio(F) = F/T , and the ratio between different behaviors
in one strategy ratio(B) = x : y : z (short for xyz), where xyz depends on initial
settings when launching the attacks.
5.2 Key Principles
The growth of a DAG is based on the continuously generated transactions. Pre-
vious transactions get weighted when tips are attached, measured by cumulative
weight (W). Two aspects are considered: the configuration of each unit weight
and the methods to select parent transactions. For the first side, the unit weight
of every single transaction randomly varies from 1 to 4, to provide a better sim-
ulation for the real scenario. For the second side, a parent selection mechanism
is required to take key metrics into consideration which contains the cumulative
weight, operation time, level difference (level represents the transactions with
the same height). Here, we present more explanations on these three metrics.
– Level Difference: Denoted as L, level represents the transactions that are
identified with the same heights. Level Difference is the distance of the
heights between current tips and the selected parent transactions.
– Cumulative Weight: Denoted as W, the cumulative weight is calculated as
an accumulated value when tips are attached. It is the sum of each unit
weight of the attached tips. The unit weight randomly varies from 1 to 4 to
avoid fraud.
– Operation Time: Denoted as T , the operation time represents the executed
time of a transaction since it was generated. A transaction will be discarded
when times out.
We provide the following principles for tip selection and abandon of invalid
transactions in the implementation. Tip selection decides how tips choose their
parent transactions. Invalid transaction decision shows how a transaction is dis-
carded. These principles limit the size of networks under control.
Definition 1 (Mechanism For Tip Selection)
p = 3× |15−Wi|+ 100
5L
− 1.5 T60 (p ≥ 0)
where, w[1] = wc (L = 1)
w[i] = 0.8w[i− 1] (L = 2− 6)
= 0.9w[i− 1] (L = 7− 16)
= 0.01w[1] (L = 17− 29)
Wi =Wi−1 + w[i], where, i ∈ L
where L is height difference, W is cumulative weight, w[i] represents individual
round weight, and wc is current weight. p represents tip selection probability.
From Definition 1, we can see that the selection probability p is mainly influ-
enced by three factors: L, W and T . L varies inversely with the p, which means
a tip tends to be impossibly selected as the level difference increases. W is an
iterative algorithm within three intervals according to L. The equation at dif-
ferent intervals has a different decay rate. The tips are required to be smoothly
decayed with a small level difference (near to the latest transaction) while be
sharply decayed at the high difference. T is used to prevent the tip from being
suspended for too long. We provide a slice of example codes in Appendix C for
a better explanation.
Definition 2 (Decision For Invalid Transaction) A newly generated trans-
action will be discarded, as Tx = ⊥, when triggering the conditions:
{Tx = ⊥ |L > 30 ||W < 30 ∩ T > 1000s}
where L is the height difference, W is the cumulative weight. T represents the
operating time.
From Definition 2, we obtain that a newly generated transaction will be
deemed as invalid when exceeding the thresholds either on the specified level
difference (30) or on operation time (1000 s). Our simulations and evaluations
of attack strategies only consider valid transactions.
5.3 Implementation Logic
Our implementation is based on the simulation of Tangle and the construction of
attack strategies. We provide detailed workflows including steps on receiving the
transactions from peer nodes, generating/sending new transactions, and launch-
ing the attack strategies. Detailed example codes are referenced in Github7.
Logic.1. Launch the Attack Strategy:
– step1: Configure all the initial parameters including total transactions, Ratio(F),
Ratio(B), and operating time T .
7 Source Code: https://github.com/BozhiWang/Tangle-based-Blockchain-attack-simulation.
– step2: Select the attack types based on strategies (see the layer2 ) from the
behaviors (see the layer1 ) and the actions (see the layer0 ).
– step3: Set different parameters of Ratio(F) and Ratio(B) for the test goals
(see in Section 5.4).
– step4: Launch the atttack transactions by Send New Transactions and Re-
ceive New Transactions.
– step5: Collect the results for evaluation and analysis. (see Section 6).
Logic.2 Receive the Transactions:
– step1: Listen to the peer nodes to receive the transactions, with up to n
transactions per second.
– step2: Put the valid transactions into the valid pool and the invalid trans-
action into the invalid pool for the verification.
– step3: Calculate the maximum height of the current DAG.
– step4: Count the cumulative weights W for the parent transactions through
weight iteration in Definition 1.
– step5: Remove the timeout/expired transactions from the transaction pool
according to the Definition 2 and change the current status of transactions.
Logic.3. Send New Transactions:
– step1: Generate transactions with fixed parameters including height, weight,
timestamp.
– step2: Select two parent transactions to verify according to the tip selection
mechanism.
– step3: Launch the PoW verification for attach tips.
– step4: Broadcast the transaction for times.
5.4 Implementation Goals
We provide four goals to evaluate attack strategies under different configurations.
Goal I aims to test different types of attacks strategies. Goal II mainly tests
combined behaviours. Goal III is to test the influence of total nodes. Goal IV
is focused on the selfish strategy. Detailed parameter settings are presented at
Table 4 in Appendix B.
Goal I: The first goal aims to test the influence of different attacks strate-
gies (mainly hybrid attacks), namely (S). The initial configurations include the
attack strategies of each type and the rate of malicious nodes. Specifically, we
set the total nodes as 100, and configure the initial rate of malicious node to
be 20%. The main variables are focused on the different strategies of attacks
(bd, be, ace, abe, ade, e, abcd, abdf) with corresponding Ratio(B) on each strategy.
The Ratio(B) is set to be {55, 433, 4222}8 respectively, for the strategies contain-
ing two, three, and four behaviors. Detailed variable configurations are shown in
the testing sets of (Set1, Set2, Set3 ).
8 We employ the abbreviation “433” to represent the ratio of “4 : 3 : 3” for simplicity
which is equally applied to other ratios.
Goal II: The second goal is going to test the influence of different ratios of
combined behaviors, namely Ratio(B). The initial configurations include three
randomly selected attack strategies in PS/DS (abe, adeabd). The total nodes are
set to be 100 with 10% malicious nodes. The main variables include different
ratios of the combined behaviors, where Ratio(B)= {811, 622, 433, 631, 613}. We
provide three testing sets with different Ratio(F) on {10%, 20%, 30%}. Detailed
configurations are listed in the testing sets of (Set4, Set5, Set6 ).
Goal III: The third goal is aimed to test the influence of total nodes. The
initial configurations include the random selected attack strategies (abe, adeabd)
with the ratios of combined behaviors 622. The variables are the total nodes
T where T = {20, 50, 100}. We present the testing sets in different ratios of
malicious nodes where Ratio(F)={10%, 20%, 30%}. Detailed configurations are
provided in the testing sets of (Set7, Set8, Set9 ).
Goal IV: The fourth goal is focused on the selfish strategy combined by
ac. The testing contains the influence by the variable Ratio(B) in Set10, the
different total nodes in Set11 and the changeable Ratio(F) in Set12. Also, the
testing items can be referenced and compared across these three sets, since the
targeted strategy ac is fixed. Detailed variable configurations are in presented in
testing sets of (Set10, Set11, Set12 ).
6 Evaluation Analyses
Based on Goals, our experiments provide different types of results. In this section,
we firstly give the specified inputs and outputs, and then show the trends of dif-
ferent testing sets. Detailed data and other outputs are presented in Appendix D.
6.1 Analysis on Result I
In the simulation I, we set totally eight attack strategies {S | bd, be, ac, abe, ade, abd,
e, abcd, abdf}, the corresponding Ratio(B) of each strategy, and three sets of
Ratio(F)={F | 10%} as the input parameters. The outputs contain the confirmed
invalid transactions, the confirm time, the abandoned invalid transactions and
the abandoned valid transactions. From the Result I in Figure 3(a), we can find
the trend caused by different factors. (1) For the same strategies, no matter how
they are made up, such as ade e and abcd, the confirmed invalid transactions are
increasing along with the number of malicious nodes in a positive correlation.
The confirm time varies in a range of 200-800s. The abandoned transactions
significantly increase with the number of malicious nodes. (2) For the different
hybrid strategies, Ratio(F) has different influences on them. Several strategies
are sensitive to the changes like abe, be. (3) The abandoned invalid transactions
and valid transactions increase at the same time along with changes on Ratio(F)
where malicious nodes have a significant influence.
6.2 Analysis on Result II
In the simulation II, we set three sets of strategies {S | abe, ade, abd}, three
Ratio(F)={F | 10%, 20%, 30%}, and five Ratio(B)= {B | 811, 622, 433, 631, 613}
as the input parameters. The outputs are the ratios between invalid transactions
and total transactions. From the Result II in Figure 3(b), we can find that (1)
For the Ratio(F) on the same strategies, such as ade (the blue column in the
histogram), invalid transactions will significantly increase along with the mali-
cious nodes. The trend is determinate for such situations. (2) For the different
strategies, we can find that the Ratio(F) has different influences on them. ade
varies monotonously with the ratio, while the other two have a peak value at
a certain ratio. (3) The attack is sensitive to some behaviors such as b. Invalid
transactions in strategies containing b (abe, abd) are more significant than the
strategies without b.
6.3 Analysis on Result III
In the simulation III, we set three attack strategies {S | abe, ade, abd} as the ba-
sic testing strategy with initial Ratio(B)={B | 622}. There are three Ratio(F)=
{F | 10%, 20%, 30%} and four sets of total nodes {Tx | 20, 50, 100, 200} as the in-
put parameters. The outputs are the ratio between confirmed invalid transactions
and total transactions. The ratio provides a direct and visualized relationship.
From the Result III in Figure 3(c), we can find (1) For the same strategy, such
as ade (the blue column in the histogram), the trend of ratio is relatively stable
under different Ratio(F). (2) The ratio maintains stable when the Ratio(B) in-
creases. This also means the ratio of invalid transactions with total transactions
varies slightly with the malicious nodes. The number of malicious nodes has lit-
tle influence on the ratio. (3) For the different combinations, the strategies like
ade are more sensitive to variations than the strategies like abe, abd. The results
show significant differences in these strategies.
6.4 Analysis on Result IV
In the simulation IV, the test sets focus on the selfish strategy ac where {S|ac}.
The first test initializes 100 total nodes, Ratio(F)= {F | 10%} and provides
six Ratio(B)={B | 91, 82, 73, 64, 55, 46}. The second test set three Ratio(F)=
{F | 10%, 20%, 30%}, Ratio(B)= {B | 82} and four sets of total nodes where
{T | 20, 50, 100, 200}. The third set initializes with 100 total nodes, Ratio(F)=
{F | 10%, 20%, 30%} and Ratio({B | 91, 82, 73, 64, 55, 46}) as the input param-
eters. The outputs are the ratio between valid transactions and total trans-
actions which provides a direct and visualized relationship. As shown in the
Result IV in Figure 3(d), we can find (1) the valid transactions maintain rel-
atively stable under different Ratio(B). (2) The ratio is stable whenever the
Ratio(F) increases or the total nodes increase. This means the ratio of valid
transactions with total transactions vary slightly with the malicious nodes. Thus
the number of malicious nodes has little influence. (3) The changes of Ratio(B)
and Ratio(F) have slight influences on the results. All above-mentioned outcomes
show that the selfish results only relates to the selfish behavior independent of
its combination or strategy. Tangle maintains stable under the selfish behaviors.
7 Discussions on Our Simulations
In this section, we provide the myths related to our simulations and analyses.
Based on the myths below, we emphasize the importance and influence of our
work in a plain and simple way.
Myth 1.Are Tangle-based blockchains important in DAG systems? DAG systems
are emerging for several years, aims to improve the scalability by parallel pro-
cessing. Tangle-based blockchains play the role of pioneer to inspire many other
open-sourced projects. DAG projects based on blocks, such as Conflux [18], par-
tially change the original concept of scalability, since the final transactions need
to be sequenced in a uniform order. At present, Tangle-based blockchain maxi-
mally inherent the property of scalability. The security analyses on such models
are educational.
Myth 2.Does the simulation benefit for the real scenario? The simulation cap-
tures key features of real Tangle-based projects. The simulation cannot com-
pletely reflect real situations in a large network due to the design limitation.
But it also provides an intuitive way to quantitatively analyze the security un-
der different types of attacks. The results and trends demonstrate the potential
vulnerabilities under multiple events in real scenarios, which would be a benefit
for future design.
Myth 3.What the main factors of the attack effects? The attacks (DS, PS, HB)
are sensitive to the Ratio(B), and the methods on how to make up a strategy
are significantly influential to the attack effect. Preventing such effects needs
to carefully consider all factors including binary actions, the ratio of behaviors,
the ratio of malicious nodes, and the strategies under different combinations.
However, the effect of selfish behavior is limited in a specified range, rather than
attack strategies. The effect will appear when a strategy contains one or more
selfish behaviors. Avoiding such effects requires to identify the selfish atomic
behaviors from the bottom.
Myth 4.What could be improved learned from the simulation? The simulation
tests on Tangle-based attacks provide us several enlightening points. (1) The
DAG can maintain stability in case of selfish behaviors no matter how it made
up or how many selfish nodes exist. (2) The increasing malicious nodes will
significantly increase the absolute number of transactions instead of probability
since the successful attacks (the ratio of {Confirmed Invalid Transaction}/{Total
Invalid Transaction}) maintains stable under different Ratio(F). (3) Tangle-
based structures are sensitive to the binary actions in Layer0, and the actions
are deterministic for the final success.
8 Conclusion
Tangle, as one of the earliest DAG-based blockchain structures, provides an en-
lightening paradigm for peers. Various DAG-based blockchains with blockless
structures are influenced by the concept of Tangle. We abstract the principles of
Tangle-based blockchain from the basic actions (bottom) to the meshed graph
network (top), including removing the structure of blocks, verifying multiple
previous transactions, and configuring tip selection algorithms. Then, according
to the above features, we simulate a simple but flexible network to construct
and evaluate different types of attacks. Specifically, we define three actions as
the basic benchmarks to construct our attack strategies layer by layer. Three
types of attack strategies are provided, including parasite attack, double spend-
ing attack, and the hybrid attack. Each attack strategy is made up by multiple
behaviors, where the behaviors are made up by different actions. We further
evaluate these attacks in multi-dimensions with 12 sets of testing experiments.
The evaluations cover the influence of both the binary selection of actions and
the changeable parameters of configurations. Furthermore, we present a com-
prehensive discussion of the derivative question based on our constructions and
evaluations. The results show the trends under different strategies and config-
urations. Our construction and evaluations provide an example for both attack
and defense towards Tangle-based blockchains.
Limitations and Future work. The complicated testing goals and experi-
mental results may confuse the readers. However, this paper mainly explains
how to analyze a fresh new blockchain structure by building up a simulation
model and progressively establishing on-top attack strategies. The comprehen-
sive experiments are tested in multi-dimensions, where various aspects could be
further studied. Detailed analyses on each single attack are not provided, such as
whether 51% is enough for parasite attacks. Therefore, we will continue diving
into more specific attacks in the future.
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Appendix A: More Details of IOTA
Bundle Structure. Fig.2 provides the bundle structure in Tangle. Several
transactions are linked by the fields of trunckTransaction and branchTransac-
tion. This figure shows how to complete the token transferring.
Value:
Tag:
Address:
Timestamp:
Index:
Bundle:
Message:
TransactionSeed sub 0 sub isub 2sub 1
add 0 add 1 add 2 add i
Tx 2
Tx 1
Index: 0
trunckTransaction
Tx 0
branchTransaction
Index: (last)
Tail
branchTransaction
trunkTransaction:
branchTransaction:
Index:
Timestamp:
Nonce:
Bundle y
Bundle i
Bundle x
Tip 
Selection
Fig. 2: Bundle Structure.
Extension of IOTA. IOTA is a novel approach in improving the scalability
of blockchain and eliminating the need for miners and transaction fees. IOTA
comprises of the backbone protocol Tangle [21], and upper layer components such
as MAM [11] for data communication and Qubic [12] for computations. Tangle is
the basic layer of IOTA to ensure its DAG-based transaction settlement and data
integrity. It is essentially formed by individual transactions that are interlinked
to each other. MAM, short for Masked Authenticated Messaging, is a second
layer data communication protocol to provide the properties on integrity and
privacy. MAM makes an encrypted data stream over Tangle regardless of the size
or cost of device. Qubic, standing for quorum-based computation, is a protocol
which specifies the solutions for oracle machines, outsourced computations, and
smart contracts. It is used in distributed systems to gain consistent and fast
computations with the least amount of costs possible.
Appendix B: Configurations on Goals
The experiment goals describe the configurations on each testing set in detail.
Goals I are tested in (Set1, Set2, Set3), while Goals II in (Set4, Set5, Set6), Goals
III in (Set7, Set8, Set9) and Goals IV in (Set10, Set11, Set12), respectively. De-
tails are presented in the following Table 4.
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Appendix C: Example Code
The tip selection mechanism is closely related to the cumulative weight of trans-
actions. Here, we provide the example codes of weight calculation, named addweight.
Appendix D: Test Results
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